This online appendix contains (i) information on the construction of the data for the wealth and debt portfolios as well as labor earnings based on the Survey of Consumer Finances, (ii) a detailed description of the calibration of the income process, (iii) the model predictions for the life-cycle pro…les and (iv) results of robustness checks for higher loan-to-value ratios of 0:9 and 0:975.
A Data appendix
This data appendix describes how we construct data counterparts for the wealth and debt portfolio as well as labor earnings in the model, using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Since the questions in the SCF survey refer to income in the previous year and agents have made their consumption and portfolio choices conditional on this income, we interpret the SCF asset data as end-of-period information at the time when the survey is carried out. We construct all variables for the full SCF sample and then apply the sampleselection criteria mentioned below. When computing the statistics in the data, we use the sampling weights provided in the SCF. We account for di¤erences in household size based on the equivalence scale reported in Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2007) , Table 1 , last column, with a weight of 1 for the …rst person in the household, 0.34 for the second person and 0.3 for each additional member of the household.
Gross labor income is the sum of wage and salary income. As in Budría Rodríguez et al. (2002), we add a fraction of the business income where this fraction is the average share of labor income in total income in the SCF. Disposable labor income is computed using the NBER tax simulator. We use the programs by Kevin Moore provided at http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/ to construct disposable labor earnings for each household in the respective SCF wave. Following the standardized instructions on the NBER website, we feed the following required SCF data into the NBER tax simulator: the U.S. state (we compute the average of the state tax payments across states, since state identi…ers are not available in the publicly accessible SCF), marital status, number of dependents, taxpayers above the age of 65 and dependent children in the household, wage income, dividend income, interest and other property income, pensions and gross social security bene…ts, non-taxable transfer income, rents paid, property tax, other itemized deductions, unemployment bene…ts, mortgage interest paid and short and long-term capital gains or losses. We then divide the resulting federal and state income tax payments, as well as federal insurance contributions of each household, by the household's gross total income in the SCF. This yields the implicit average tax rate for each household. The mean of that average tax rate for consumers of working age 23-64 in the SCF 2004 is 21.5%. Finally, we use the average tax rate of each household in the respective SCF wave to compute household disposable labor income as (1 -household average tax rate) * household gross labor income (including taxable transfers) and then add non-taxable transfers.
When constructing data counterparts for the wealth and debt portfolio of each household in the model, we refer to Table 1 in the paper.
Housing wealth is de…ned as the sum of the value of the owner-occupied home that is the primary residence.
Gross secured debt is de…ned as the sum of mortgage debt, home equity loans and lines of credit secured by the primary residence.
The di¤erence between the value of housing wealth and gross secured debt is the home equity held by the household.
Gross …nancial assets are de…ned as the sum of assets besides the housing wealth de…ned above. This is the sum of money in checking accounts, savings accounts, money market accounts, money market mutual funds, call accounts in brokerages, certi…cates of deposit, bonds, account-type pension plans, thrift accounts, the current value of life insurance, savings bonds, other managed funds, other …nancial assets, stocks and mutual funds, owned non…nancial business assets, residential and non-residential property that is not included in housing wealth, vehicles, jewelry, antiques, and other small durable items.
Gross unsecured debt is de…ned as all debt besides the gross secured debt de…ned above.
Given that we have to account for the total debt of each household, this balance sheet position also includes auto loans which are secured but not by the primary residence.
The di¤erence between the gross …nancial assets and gross unsecured debt is the other equity held by each household.
Net worth is then de…ned as the sum of home equity and other equity.
We still need to de…ne the data counterparts for unsecured debt, secured debt and …nan-cial assets in the model. These counterparts are not equal to the gross positions, since many households in the data hold debt and …nancial assets at the same time, which cannot occur in the model. In order match the SCF data to the model, we consolidate the data at the household level so that households indeed hold either debt or …nancial assets. We proceed in the following way:
Unsecured debt is zero for households with non-negative other equity, and equals other equity if other equity is negative. Secured debt for households whose other equity is negative is set equal to their gross secured debt and their …nancial assets are set to zero.
For households who hold positive amounts of other equity, we then consolidate these positions with gross secured debt to obtain the corresponding measures as follows.
Secured debt is zero for households whose sum of gross secured debt and positive amounts of other equity is positive. Otherwise secured debt equals gross secured debt net of positive amounts of other equity.
Financial assets are zero for households whose sum of gross secured debt and positive amounts of other equity is negative. Otherwise …nancial assets equal positive amounts of other equity net of gross secured debt.
Net …nancial assets are the sum of …nancial assets, secured debt and unsecured debt.
It remains to describe how we classify households as bankrupt. In order to construct a measure for earnings risk before retirement, we recover j from the SCF data for consumers aged between 24 and 65, which corresponds to income realizations in the model between the ages of 23 and 64, since households are asked about income in the previous year. We regress the log of earnings on a quartic age polynomial which approximates the age-earnings patterns in the data well (Murphy and Welch, 1990) . We then use the standard deviation of the residuals in the regression to calibrate the distribution of earnings shocks z ij . We assume that the shocks are drawn from a log-normal distribution, where in our calibration to the SCF 2004 SCF , z 2004 N (0; 0:603). Although a formal test rejects lognormality due to some skewness, log-normality is a rather good parametric approximation of the data. The assumption of log-normality is attractive because it is convenient when we approximate the AR(1) income process by a Markov chain.
We calibrate the annual autocorrelation of log-earnings shocks as = 0:95, which implies a variance for the innovations " ij of 0:059. We have checked the robustness of our results for (12) of the paper by a Markov chain with 11 income states to contain the computational burden, using the so-called Rouwenhorst method. As pointed out by Kopecky and Suen (2010) , this method performs particularly well for highly persistent processes.
Since the SCF surveys are repeated cross-sections and we do not observe the full lifecycle income of most cohorts in the period for which SCF surveys are available, we convert the cross-sectional age-earnings patterns into deterministic life-cycle pro…les accounting for growth in life-cycle income. As further explained below, we compute the growth rate of average net labor earnings by constructing a pseudo panel using all comparable SCF waves since 1983. We use that panel to regress log-labor earnings on a quartic age polynomial and a linear time trend. We …nd that this parsimonious speci…cation explains the data well. Most importantly for our purposes, we …nd that annual earnings growth is 1%. The estimation results also support our assumption that cohort e¤ects are not important, beyond the linear time trend of earnings, when constructing the life-cycle pro…les with cross-sectional data.
Statistically we cannot reject the hypothesis at the 1% signi…cance level that the coe¢ cients of cohort dummies are zero in the regression of log-labor earnings on a quartic age polynomial and a linear time trend.
Given these results, we use average labor earnings as the income unit, which grow at an annual rate of 1%. This deterministic growth is taken into account by adjusting the cross-sectional age-earnings patterns with a growth factor of 1:01 (age base age) . The base age is the reference age which will allow us to make income units comparable across cohorts in a speci…c year.
By considering deterministic income growth over the life cycle, we attribute only part of 
B.2 Income after retirement
After retirement, consumers receive individual-speci…c retirement bene…ts b i . These bene…ts are approximated based on the U.S. social security legislation (see http://www.ssa.gov).
Retirement bene…ts in the U.S. depend on the 35 highest annual earnings before retirement.
In terms of the recursive formulation of the model this would imply that, until retirement, the history of labor earnings would enter the model as a state variable. Clearly this would make the numerical solution of the model extremely costly. We thus follow Yang (2009) and determine retirement bene…ts conditional on the last income before retirement. More precisely, we proceed with the following steps.
First, we transform the net labor earnings y ij of the model into gross labor earnings e y ij using the average tax rate of 0.215 for the sample of households with a head aged between 24 and 65 in the SCF 2004 (including FICA taxes).
Second, we take into account that, for the computation of retirement bene…ts in the U.S., age-j earnings of individual i are scaled by average earnings growth that has occurred between age j and the last period before retirement T r 1. We thus multiply gross labor earnings e y ij in periods j < T r by the factor 1:01 (T r 1 j) to obtain indexed gross labor earnings.
Third, we compute the average indexed gross labor earnings y(z i;T r 1 ) over the last 
before retirement. Clearly, there are many di¤erent histories of earnings which lead to e y i;T r 1 .
We assign probabilities to these histories using the reverse transition probability R(z ij ; z i;j 1 ).
This corresponds to the probability that z i;j 1 is the predecessor of z ij . Applying Bayes'rule, we can compute this probability as
where P is the standard "forward"transition probability and f ( ) is the unconditional probability obtained from the stationary distribution.
Fourth, we set the social-security income cap at $87; 000 and the …rst and the second bendpoints at $606 and $3; 653, respectively, as speci…ed in the U. where y = y(z i;T r 1 ) and bp 1 and bp 2 denote the two bendpoints.
Our calibration of retirement bene…ts implies that the replacement ratio of bene…ts over gross income is 51% for the median income in the last period before retirement. This replacement rate is similar to the rates reported in Biggs and Springstead (2008).
B.3 Pseudo-panel estimation to compute average earnings growth
The SCF is a triennial survey and comparable data exist for the period from 1983 to 2010.
As is common practice, we do not use the 1986 survey, since it was only a limited reinterview We construct a pseudo panel for three-year age cohorts, computing cohort averages for log-labor earnings and the terms of the quartic age polynomial. Table 1 We augment the income process before retirement, presented in the calibration section, with a linear time trend to capture time e¤ects and use the pseudo panel to estimate the log-linear speci…cation. Note that this speci…cation derives from the structural assumptions about the income process. Whereas the log-linear regression of labor earnings thus has a structural interpretation, a similar regression with wealth as dependent variable does not. In fact, such a regression would be misspeci…ed for our model. Note that we want to calibrate our model to the most recent data in the 2000s. Hence, we use the pseudo-panel regressions only to compute the annual growth rate of earnings. We then use this growth rate to map between the age cross-sections in the last available SCF survey before the …nancial crisis (from 2004) and the life-cycle pro…les of labor earnings and wealth in the model. Table 2 displays the results of the regressions. In our preferred speci…cation in column
(1), we estimate an annual growth rate of labor earnings of approximately 1%. In column (2) we replace the linear time trend with time dummies. Comparing the adjusted R 2 statistic in columns (1) and (2) reveals that the …t of the data remains good with the more parsimonious speci…cation in column (1). As is well known, column (3) shows that the data variation could also be explained with cohort dummies. Because of linear dependence, we cannot simultaneously use age, year and cohort dummies as regressors. If we restrict the age e¤ects to a quartic polynomial and the time e¤ect to a linear trend, as in the speci…cation in column C Life-cycle pro…les Figure 1 displays the life-cycle pro…les for variables of interest where we take averages over the simulated population of 100,000 consumers aged between 26 and 76. Home equity, …nancial assets and unsecured debt are in units of average net-labor earnings per adultequivalent. Figure 1 shows that …nancial assets and home equity display the familiar tent shape over the life cycle. The home ownership rate steadily increases over the life cycle before consumers sell their owned housing wealth at the end of life. Unsecured debt is largest (in absolute terms) for young consumers and then decreases with age. As expected, consumers substantially reduce their home equity and …nancial assets during retirement. Home equity, Table 3 : Parameters for the calibrated numerical solution with = 0:9 or = 0:975. Notes:
Annualized parameters.
that is housing wealth net of secured debt, drops by a large amount in the penultimate period when much of the …nancial assets have been depleted already.
The decumulation of wealth components towards the end of the retirement period clearly results from the assumption of a …nite life, as in Livshits et al. (2007) . Allowing for a positive probability of death and assuming accidental bequests, however, would substantially increase the computational burden of our model, since it requires consistency of bequests with accumulation behavior, both of which need to be determined simultaneously in equilibrium.
The properties of the model solution in earlier periods of life, which are relevant for our comparisons of the model with the data, are largely independent of any speci…c assumptions about the behavior in the terminal period. This is due to the convergence properties of backward induction of value functions employed in our analysis.
D Robustness: higher loan-to-value ratio
In this section we present robustness results if we allow for higher loan-to-value ratios of 0:9 or 0:975 instead of 0:8 as in the benchmark. Table 3 shows that only small changes in the parameter values are needed to recalibrate the model for the higher loan-to-value ratios. (dashed lines) rather well for both cases. We have explained in the main text that the homeequity distribution for homeowners with unsecured debt is important for the quantitative e¤ects of homestead exemptions on the model equilibrium. Figures 4 and 5 display the home equity distribution for homeowners with unsecured debt if we increase the loan-to-value ratio from 0:8 to 0:9 or 0:975, respectively. Comparison with Figure 5 in the paper shows that homeowners with unsecured debt hold less home equity as the restriction on the maximal loan-to-value ratio is relaxed from 0:8 to higher values of 0:9 or 0:975. For the calibrated parameters, they …nd it optimal to reduce their home equity before borrowing unsecured.
Less home equity of homeowners with unsecured debt implies that even smaller exemptions than in the benchmark case eliminate the value of home equity as informal collateral and a commitment device.
As shown in Tables 4 and 5 
